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ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday, 3 September 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI

(Poland)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE  
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. V. TYLNER  
Mr. Y. BUCEK  
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU  
ATO M. HAMID  
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO  
Mr. P.M. GEORGE

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. LOBODYCZ  
Mr. T. SLOWINSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Mr. P. KELLIN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV  
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV  
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT  
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID  
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir MICHAEL WRIGHT  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON  
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I declare open the seventy-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

We have a very busy day; there are already thirteen speakers on our list. As we agreed last Friday, 31 August, we shall have, in principle, two meetings.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): Before I make my statement, I should like to express my appreciation to the representative of Czechoslovakia for giving me his place on the list of speakers this morning.

My delegation joins all those other delegations that have commended the initiative taken jointly by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom a week ago in submitting the two draft treaties (ENDC/58 and 59) on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Believing, as we have always done, that progress could only follow consideration and discussion of concrete and practical issues, we welcome this step as a sincere effort to move us forward towards our goal of a world from which nuclear tests will have been banished for ever.

We have of course given and will continue to give close study to those two important documents. But with one exception, to which I will refer later, we do not propose, at any rate at this time, to comment in detail on any of their provisions. It has always been our position that the practical details of an agreement to end nuclear tests have to be worked out by the nuclear Powers themselves and that we can best help them by trying to provide them with a basis for negotiation. This we believe we have done, in the form of the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/23). Although I suspect that this may be becoming tiresome, I am afraid I have to join the ranks of those who maintain that that memorandum provides a realistic basis for an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests. Time has only strengthened our convictions on that score; and although we cannot, and do not, claim that our memorandum provides the only basis for a treaty we cannot help noting with some sense of gratification that such progress as has been made in bringing the positions of the two sides closer together -- and, as our Swedish colleague, Mr. Edberg, brought out in his thoughtful statement last Friday (ENDC/PV.77), progress has been made --- has been on the basis of the memorandum. We were glad, therefore, to hear Mr. Dean say on 27 August, when he introduced the documents, that:

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"These proposals also take into account constructive suggestions by the eight new members of this Conference, including those contained in their memorandum of 16 April 1962." (ENDC/PV.75, p.6)

We trust that both sides will find the memorandum to be of continuing value as they get further into the negotiations. We were also happy to hear Mr. Godber, representing the other sponsor of the draft treaties, say on the same day:

"Neither of these offers is an ultimatum; neither offer is on the basis of 'take it or leave it'; both offers are negotiable." (ibid., p.21)

We commend that flexible attitude, for without it there can be no real negotiation and therefore no prospect of reaching agreement.

I should now like to say a few words on how we view the recent initiative of the United States and United Kingdom delegations. Like every other delegation present here, the Burmese delegation wishes to see an end to all nuclear testing in all environments at the earliest possible moment. Our objective is -- and until we reach it will always remain -- a comprehensive treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater and underground in conditions which will give every party to the treaty reasonable assurance that the ban is being observed by all other parties, for without such assurance the treaty would always be in jeopardy. We should like to see such a treaty signed today, but since that is not possible we would be prepared -- such is our desire to make even a beginning in bringing this terrible game to an end -- to support a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, always provided however that it is generally accepted as a strictly interim measure and as a step leading to a comprehensive treaty, not just a step towards it.

It seems to us quite evident that a treaty covering the atmosphere, outer space and underwater which left all the parties free to test underground could not last for long. It would have a most precarious and, in all probability, a very short life. To see why that is likely to be so we have only to recall Mr. Dean's recent recital of what could be accomplished through underground tests in the field of nuclear weaponry (ENDC/PV.71, p.20) -- a recital which was used by the Soviet representative (ENDC/PV.76, pp.17-~~et~~ seq.) as his main argument against the proposed partial test ban. Our conclusion therefore is that a partial test ban could have no lasting independent existence; it could not hope to endure unless it was extended within a reasonably short period to all environments; it must somehow be linked to, must lead to and

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become absorbed in a comprehensive treaty. Let us always keep in mind the fact that a partial test ban treaty which came to grief could easily do more harm than not having a partial test ban treaty at all. At the very least, such a development would close the door more tightly to a comprehensive treaty. Therefore, in considering a partial test ban, let us keep these considerations always in view. By all means let us go ahead and consider such a step, because the world very badly needs a shot in the arm. But also let us make sure that that shot has the desired effect and that its delayed action does not make the patient's condition worse than before. Let us not fall into the error of regarding a partial ban as an easy alternative; to begin with, as our Swedish colleague has said (ENDC/PV.77, p. 29 ), it is not really an alternative, and it is far from easy.

What makes it so difficult is that the solution which most readily comes to mind -- a moratorium on underground tests -- proves on examination also to be a double-edged weapon. We believe that in the existing state of the world an unconditional moratorium on underground tests would not last; and once such a moratorium were broken tests in other environments would follow as surely as night follows the day. Experience teaches us how little reliance can be placed on an unconditional moratorium. It is of course a sad historical fact that the Soviet Union ended the last voluntary moratorium by resuming tests a year ago. But we also know that the Government of the United States itself was not free itself from strong pressure to resume testing. To its great credit it then resisted the pressure. But the point we wish to make is this: if an unconditional moratorium on underground tests were now to be declared, who could doubt that it would not be long before internal pressures built up again on both sides to a point where they would become irresistible; and, as we see today, a moratorium that fails adds greatly to the magnitude of our problem.

My delegation submits that the conclusion which emerges clearly from all this is that, whatever else happens, there must be no let-up in our efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive treaty. We must press on with all possible speed, and intensify our efforts, not pausing for breath even if we succeed in reaching agreement on an interim partial ban treaty. In fact, that would call for greater determination and haste. What adds to the sense of urgency, if such a thing were possible, is the agreement -- or, if you like, understanding -- reached between Moscow, Washington and London that 1 January 1963 should be the target date for the cessation of tests. We look on this as a forward step, and congratulate our Mexican colleague on his happy original thought (ENDC/PV.34, p.16), our Soviet colleague for reacting favourably to it and our United States and United Kingdom colleagues for their ready positive responses.

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For all those reasons the Burmese delegation warmly welcomes and supports the joint proposal of the United States and United Kingdom delegations that the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee should continue its work during the forthcoming recess. We assume, of course, that this will in no way inhibit the discussions on nuclear testing in the General Assembly since we believe that a full discussion there would be useful from every point of view, and perhaps not least of all from the viewpoint of the nuclear Powers.

We should like also to support the constructive idea which was put forward by the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Edberg, at our meeting of 31 August (ENDC/PV.77, p. 32 ) to the effect that the international scientific commission proposed in the eight nation memorandum (ENDC/28) should be established now, at least on an interim basis, with a view to assisting the two parties to reach agreement on a comprehensive treaty. We believe that proposal has much merit and we commend it to the nuclear Powers for their most earnest and, we trust, favourable consideration.

In the opening part of my statement I said that there was one provision in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaties to which I would be referring. That provision is contained in paragraph 6 of Article VIII of document ENDC/58, which reads:

"On-site inspection of areas designated by the Executive Officer pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article shall be carried out pursuant to this Article:

- a. on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States of America or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, if requested by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
- b. on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, if requested by the United States of America or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
- c. on territory under the jurisdiction or control of any other Party, if directed by the Commission." (ENDC/58, p.8)

Quite honestly my delegation is unable to understand why the co-sponsors of the draft feel that, in this matter, it is necessary to discriminate between the territories of the United States, the United Kingdom and Soviet Union on one side and the territories of the other parties on the other. Our view is that once an impartial high-level scientific commission is appointed it should be for that commission and that commission alone to decide if an on-site inspection is required in any concrete case; and if,



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by agreement between the parties, the number of on-site inspections is to be limited to an annual quota, then it should still be the commission which determines which unidentified events should be brought within the agreed quota. We submit that to do otherwise would be to cast doubt on the integrity, impartiality and objectiveness of the commission, making it more difficult to secure the services of those scientists most competent to discharge their onerous tasks. We would hope, therefore, that the co-sponsors of the treaty will be able to accept our view on this point. And while we are on this point, we should like also to make an appeal to the delegation of the Soviet Union. Mr. Kuznetsov has already told us that the Soviet Union does not preclude the possibility of on-site inspections by the Commission in concrete cases. In other words, the position of the Soviet Union is not inflexible with regard to on-site inspections. They are not rejected on principle. We were indeed happy to receive that clarification. But if the co-sponsors of document ENDC/58 would be prepared to accept the suggestion just made by my delegation, it would be our fervent hope that the Soviet Union too would be prepared to take a further step which also would be in consonance with the integrity, impartiality and objectivity of the international scientific commission proposed in the eight-power memorandum which the Soviet Union has accepted as the basis for negotiations. We agree with all those who have said that the gap is narrow. We believe that it can be bridged on the basis of practical requirements and not of principles. We pray that these appeals will not go unheard.

Finally, we should like to revert to the problem of a partial test ban. As I have already said, we do not believe that a treaty which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, but which left all the parties free to test underground, would be a lasting treaty; equally, we do not believe that an unconditional moratorium would solve our problem. What, then, should we do? Should we just by-pass a partial ban and concentrate on a comprehensive treaty? But my delegation has already submitted that, whatever else happens, we must maintain all efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive treaty. The question really is whether, in addition to the efforts just described, we should try to agree on a partial ban, but as a strictly interim measure leading on to a comprehensive ban. We think that a world longing for some immediate relief from the tensions and fears generated by nuclear tests would not understand it if we made no effort to get

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whatever relief becomes possible at any given time. Yet we have a responsibility to ensure that we do not present it with something that might turn out to be a snare and a delusion. That is how my delegation views the problem.

We have given that problem our most careful attention and wonder whether a solution might not possibly be found on the following lines:

The heads of State or Government of the nuclear Powers to declare publicly that they

1. assume personal responsibility for ensuring that no underground tests are conducted by their governments, or under their auspices, until a comprehensive treaty comes into force;
2. pledge themselves anew to work for the speedy attainment of a comprehensive treaty and to assume personal responsibility for the overall direction of work of their delegations on the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests;
3. agree, following the Swedish proposal, that the international scientific commission envisaged in the eight-Power memorandum be established as soon as possible, and that their delegations will co-operate fully with that commission in working out an agreement on the complete cessation of nuclear tests.

We believe that a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under-water, which was buttressed by such top-level declarations, accompanied by the physical establishment of the international scientific commission, might provide the kind of requisite reasonable expectation that the interim partial ban would be extended to underground nuclear tests. We offer the thought, in all humility, to the nuclear Powers and express the hope that it will be sympathetically considered. We trust that it will not be rejected out of hand on the ground that public declarations on nuclear testing by heads of State or Government have been made before. The situation which faces us is so grave, and the dangers so imminent and so awesome, that it would be wrong to rely on history as our principal guide. Let us remember also that different personalities have said different things at different times on that subject, and let Laos and Vienna teach us that subsequent public declarations have brought beneficial results. As so many of our colleagues have rightly reminded us, time is running out. The need is to look forward rather than backward. We need to make fresh attempts to reach understandings. If we let history get too much in our way we may soon have no history.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia): In my intervention today I should like to expound the position of the Czechoslovak delegation on the two main questions now under consideration by the Committee, namely, the question of the reduction of conventional armaments, which we are discussing under item 5(c) of the agreed procedure of the work (ENDC/52) of the Committee, and the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. With regard to the reduction of conventional armaments I shall not attempt to deal with all the facets of that problem, but rather to touch upon those which we consider to be the most important. We have noticed with interest that the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, and the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, in their interventions on 24 and 31 August respectively, invoked the interests of smaller States when speaking of the main principles which serve as a guide for the consideration by their delegations of the question of the reduction of conventional armaments. Mr. Dean alleged that in connexion with the reduction of conventional armaments the smaller States would have to face problems other than those of the great Powers (ENDC/PV.74, p.49-50). He pointed out that, unlike the Soviet proposal, the United States proposal does not envisage the reduction by all States of their conventional armaments by 30 per cent as early as stage I. A similar position was taken by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, who, at our meeting of 31 August, said inter alia:

"... when the final requirements for internal security purposes -- particularly of the smaller Powers ... come to be considered, it may well be found unrealistic to apply on a world-wide scale a reduction of 30 per cent on all small conventional armaments in stage I." (ENDC/PV.77, p.20)

The United States and the United Kingdom representatives reached the same conclusion, namely, that because smaller countries do not possess nuclear weapons conventional armaments are allegedly the cardinal problem on which they should focus their attention today. Moreover, it was even suggested that a working sub-committee should be set up for the purpose. Our delegation holds that as far as disarmament is concerned the interests of the smaller countries lie, in effect, in something different from what was asserted by the representative of the United Kingdom and the United States.

Of course, the possibility of specific problems arising for some smaller States in connexion with disarmament measures in the field of conventional armaments cannot be ruled out. In due time those problems will have to be not only taken into

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consideration but solved, taking into account both the interests of such countries and the necessity of maintaining equal security for all countries in the process of disarmament. But on what ground have the United States and the United Kingdom delegations concluded that such partial problems capable of solution at the appropriate time should today attract the primary attention of the smaller States? Why, in the "interest" of smaller States, should the process of disarmament be postponed or slackened with respect to some of them?

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic may rightly be considered to be one of the smaller States. However, we are prepared to assume all these applicable obligations, including those relating to the reduction of conventional armaments, from the very beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament. We are not worried by the problem whether or not an exception should be made as far as we are concerned in the question of the reduction of conventional armaments or whether we should delay the realization of disarmament until some later date. What is decisive for us is the policy of our government, which sees the main purpose of disarmament as the strengthening of our own security as well as of general security in Europe and throughout the world and the safeguarding of a life in peace for our people.

What is of "major concern" to us -- to quote the phrase used by Mr. Dean? To consider in what categories of conventional armaments we should try to limit the generally applicable percentage of reduction, or to try, above all, to achieve the removal from our closest neighbourhood of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles stationed on foreign bases in the Federal Republic of Germany and aimed at our country -- those nuclear weapons and vehicles the possession of which, or the right to decide about their use, at least -- the generals of the Bundeswehr have not ceased to aspire to? Under the United States proposal, during stage I, neither those military bases nor the delivery vehicles stationed thereon would be removed from our neighbourhood. Likewise, the danger would remain that, if not directly, then through NATO, at least, the former Hitlerite generals in Bundeswehr uniforms would ultimately acquire the right to decide on the use of such weapons -- and that is an objective which is almost within their reach today.

We could speak at some length about the danger for the smaller States of Western Europe, in the event of war, from the very existence of foreign military bases on their territories. Would it not be well to focus our attention in that direction also when speaking of the interests of the smaller States? It is not our intention

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to speak for all the other smaller States, but we do not think that the problem of the liquidation of delivery vehicles would be, for the small States which have no nuclear weapons, only a theoretical, abstract or even less important problem than that of the reduction of conventional armaments. Today, the danger of a nuclear war directly concerns all of humanity, every single State, large and small, even if, of course, the decisive responsibility rests with the nuclear Powers.

Therefore, without underestimating the importance of the reduction of conventional weapons, we maintain that it is in the interest of countries large and small that the liquidation of all nuclear delivery vehicles, together with the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops, should take place as early as in stage I, thereby removing the threat of a nuclear war from the life of mankind. If we reach agreement on that basic question, on which we should concentrate our primary attention, the solution of various specific problems of smaller States concerning conventional armaments would surely present no difficulties. However it is not at all necessary, at this stage, to set up a special sub-committee for the consideration of the question.

We have already shown that the problem of reducing conventional armaments can be properly solved only within the context of the other disarmament measures to be taken in stage I, including, above all, the liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles and the dismantling of foreign military bases. That is what the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) provides for. Under that treaty, while the liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles, together with the liquidation of military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops, would practically remove the threat of nuclear war by the end of stage I, the 30 per cent reduction of conventional armaments, along with a corresponding reduction of armed forces in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, would also substantially reduce the danger of an aggressive war waged by conventional weapons.

However, if we look at the problem of reducing conventional armaments in the context of the United States draft, the situation presents itself in an altogether different light. The fact that that draft makes no distinction between nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments and does not provide for the liquidation of all conventional armaments, but only of the main types, in stage I complicates the whole problem considerably. What would be the result of the 30 per cent reduction of only certain types of conventional armaments in conditions of full

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combat readiness of 70 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles -- the main potential instruments for unleashing a nuclear war --- in conditions of the maintenance of foreign military bases and of the corresponding facilities which are the most suitable military instruments for aggressive operations? Undoubtedly it would neither remove the danger of a nuclear war nor reduce the possibility of a war being unleashed by conventional means. The concrete case in which we in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are interested is that of the territory of the German Federal Republic, in respect of which such reduction of conventional armaments as is provided for in the United States draft would be a sheer formality. What would be the specific significance of the conventional armaments which would remain in conditions of the maintenance of 70 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles, of troops on foreign territories and of foreign military bases? Nothing can veil the obvious fact that those armaments would retain in full their military importance and all the other combat capabilities in one and the same unchanged context --- that of being conducive to the unleashing and even waging of a nuclear war.

The Czechoslovak delegation welcomes the fact that, thanks to the attitude of the Soviet Union, which accepted the United States proposal for a percentage reduction in respect of conventional armaments -- but not, of course, in respect of nuclear delivery vehicles in single stages of disarmament -- as well as the principle of carrying out at the appropriate time the categorization by types of all conventional weapons, there appeared a certain rapprochement on this question. That applies to the reduction of the quantity and the restriction of the production of conventional weapons as well as to control measures. We think that some minor differences in opinion could be reconciled in further negotiations. But the stubborn opposition of the delegations of the NATO countries to the solution of the cardinal question of stage I, i.e. 100 per cent liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles, the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops, makes this rapprochement hypothetical, although it may be of some positive importance in future negotiations.

At our previous meetings many delegations also expressed their opinions on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Permit me to state our firm conviction that the solution of that question is not a difficult problem today because there is a workable basis for an early agreement in the memorandum (ENDC/28) submitted by the eight neutral countries.

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Similarly to delegations of other countries, our delegation has had the opportunity of drawing attention repeatedly to the undignified game which the Western Powers have been playing with the eight-nation memorandum, submitted by its sponsors as the expression of their sincere endeavour to facilitate agreement on this important question.

Developments have fully confirmed the considerations to which we drew attention. Let us recall certain facts. After some reluctance the Western Powers, as is well known, with many reservations accepted the eight-nation memorandum as "one of the bases" for discussion. At the same time they spared no effort to distort the substance of the memorandum and to interpret it along the lines of the old Western position of April 1961. However, that was not enough. Let us point out what the real position of the United States and the United Kingdom delegations is on the eight-nation memorandum, following the submission of the Western proposals of 27 August 1962.

The first proposal (ENDC/58) of the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom, the draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments, is merely a repetition, in contractual form, of the United States proposals of 14 August ( ENDC/PV.69, p.9). It has been convincingly proved that they are merely a new version of the old United States position and consequently can in no case serve as a basis for agreement. The latest proposal has nothing in common with the substance of the eight-nation memorandum and represents, in effect, a retrogressive step.

In regard to the second proposal (ENDC/59), the draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, the Western Powers moved, to some extent only, closer to the Soviet proposal (ENDC/11) of 27 November 1961. I say with emphasis "to some extent only", not "entirely", because the United States and the United Kingdom want the testing of nuclear weapons underground to be continued without any restriction. We are firmly convinced that nothing of the sort can be allowed.

It is not my intention to repeat all that has been said about the danger stemming from underground tests and the relationship between such tests and the nuclear armaments race. We all realize that it is our foremost task to contribute in the first place to the cessation of nuclear armament and to the removal of the danger of a nuclear war. However, we would never be able to fulfil that task if

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underground test explosions were to continue and result in further perfection of nuclear weapons and thereby the intensification of the nuclear armament race. Once, however, the Western Powers said "a", it would be logical and appropriate for them also to say "b" -- that is, that they agree that underground tests should not be carried out until a permanent solution to the problem is reached. Many delegations including those of Nigeria and India, have already expressed themselves to this effect.

On the question of nuclear tests the delegations of the socialist countries do not hold a rigid position. They are willing to consider seriously different proposals which would facilitate the solution of both underground tests and the problem of the cessation of tests in general. In that connexion the proposal of the delegation of Mexico (ENDC/PV.34, p.16) in May this year that all tests should be stopped as from a certain date -- for instance 1 January 1963 -- deserves particular attention. However, it follows from the logic of the proposal that it should be implemented outside the context of the treaty on the discontinuance of tests, because, as each treaty contains provisions concerning its entry into force, the submission of that proposal would not make sense.

Unfortunately, both the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in their recent interventions, and President Kennedy at his press conference on 29 August, have made it abundantly clear that any moratorium on underground tests or a similar solution, as, for instance, that suggested by the delegation of India, (ENDC/PV.75, pp.53-54) is unacceptable to them. If that be the case, then the second proposal of the Western Powers also will not lead to the solution of the question and will be but another attempt to divert attention from the eight-nation memorandum and prevent the reaching of agreement.

We can see, therefore, that in their play with the memorandum of the Eight nations the Western Powers have gone so far that today they do not even consider it as "one of the bases" for discussion. At our meeting on 31 August the head of the United States delegation, Mr. Dean, made it explicitly clear that in the view of the Western Powers further discussion would be held exclusively on the basis of the two Western drafts and issued an invitation to the delegation of the Soviet Union in that sense (ENDC/PV.77, pp. 37-38).

What do the Western Powers propose? In effect, they are placing before the Committee two ultimatum-like alternatives with regard to the cessation of tests which would be advantageous for them in either case. The first alternative means,



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in principle, under the cloak of the "stop-all-tests" requirement, the return to the old position with insistence on international on-site inspections, which would enable the Western Powers to collect intelligence data on the socialist countries. The other alternative is the unsatisfactory partial solution which would make it possible for some circles in the United States to continue nuclear armament. Such is the meaning of the bare facts.

We consider it necessary to re-emphasize that the only way leading to a satisfactory and comprehensive solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is the eight-nation memorandum. We cannot but fully agree with what the representative of Sweden, Mr. Edberg, had to say on the eight nation memorandum at our last meeting. He said:

"We still feel that it provides not only a realistic but probably the only possible bridge for a compromise." (ENDC/PV.77, p.30)

The same opinion was stated by the delegation of Brazil a few days ago and explicitly today by the representative of Burma. Thus, the Western proposals of 27 August do not lead to our aim, no matter how much the Western delegations try to prove the contrary. The solution of the problem of nuclear weapon tests therefore continues to depend on the position of the Western Powers. The sooner they relinquish their old positions, the sooner will it be possible to reach agreement on the cessation of tests, which all nations throughout the world so urgently demand.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I intend this morning to speak mainly on item 5(c) of our agreed programme (ENDC/52), that is the question of the reduction of conventional armaments in stage I. But before doing so I should like to refer briefly to the subject which most of us consider should have first priority in our work here, and that is how to reach agreement on stopping nuclear weapon tests. Last Friday the representatives of Sweden and Brazil were among those who made a further contribution to our discussion of the question, and I think that both those members of our Committee emphasized the important point that despite the very real difficulties which must be overcome, and despite our disappointment that as a result of those difficulties there is still no agreement between the nuclear Powers, nevertheless significant progress has been made recently in delimiting this area of agreement.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The representative of Sweden drew our attention (ENDC/PV.77, p.27) to some of the points at which the positions of the two sides are now closer than hitherto. He rightly urged that negotiations continue in order to work out a concrete and practical agreement on those aspects of a test ban respecting which there seems to be no fundamental dispute. In order to achieve a comprehensive test ban there is a clear and urgent need for detailed negotiation of this sort with regard to the character of the detection system as well as the composition and functions of the international commission. We noted that although our Czechoslovak colleague quoted Mr. Edberg in another connexion (supra, p. 17 ), he had nothing to say about this proposal for a constructive procedure on how the work of finding a solution to the test ban problem should be carried out. The representative of Brazil last Friday also stressed how much ground has been covered recently in the laborious search for a solution to the problem, and he suggested that the nuclear Powers may have come closer to agreement than they themselves are yet able to acknowledge (ENDC/PV.77, p.25).

As for a preliminary treaty, one banning those tests in the three environments which both sides now recognize present no verification problems, the Canadian delegation cannot see why the single outstanding difficulty concerning whether or not such a limited ban must include a formal understanding on underground tests should present an insuperable barrier. If both sides genuinely want to halt testing and show good will diplomatic ingenuity can surely devise an acceptable method permitting an early conclusion of a treaty to ban atmospheric, outer space and underwater tests. That would create a favourable climate for the subsequent extension of treaty commitments to comprise the cessation of every kind of test everywhere.

We heard with very great interest the important statement that was made this morning by the representative of Burma (Supra, pp. 5 et s.) and I should like to say that the Canadian delegation hopes that some of the constructive suggestions which he included in his statement will receive careful consideration by the nuclear test Sub-Committee. The submission a week ago by the United Kingdom and the United States of two draft treaty texts (ENDC/58 and 59) has given the negotiations in this respect new material and, we think, a new chance to succeed; and it would be tragic indeed if that chance were lost. The delegation of Canada therefore warmly welcomes and supports the proposal made by the representative of the United States (ENDC/PV.77, p.38) with the agreement of the United Kingdom, at our last meeting that during the

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forthcoming recess the members of the Sub-Committee should carry on their work and try to remove the few remaining obstacles to agreement. At this moment there may well be only one more lap to run before the goal of a test ban is reached, and only a further effort at real negotiations can prove whether that is so. It would be inexcusable, the Canadian delegation feels, to let this moment pass without making the required effort. So my delegation looks forward to hearing from the Soviet delegation that it intends to continue uninterrupted negotiations with the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers, so that an anxious world may still cherish the hope that an agreement on that vital problem will be reported within the next few weeks or, at any rate, before the present year is out.

Turning now to the question of conventional armaments, the Canadian delegation was encouraged during our seventy-sixth and seventy-seventh meetings by the recognition of the drawing together of positions on the reduction of conventional armaments in the disarmament plans of the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. The Soviet delegation has stated that in so far as conventional armaments are concerned it is prepared to accept 30 per cent reduction in stage I, as proposed by the United States, provided that the reduction extends throughout the full scale of arms. Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, stated on 24 August that his delegation was flexible on that point but he observed that, by increasing the categories to be reduced in stage I, the verification problem will be made more complex at a phase of the proceedings where simplicity of control and verification is of great importance (ENDC/PV.74, p.49).

The recent redraft (ENDC/30, Add.1) of the United States proposals concerning restrictions on production further facilitates agreement in a manner which I shall deal with presently, but it would be too optimistic to presume that because the areas of difference in that matter are now narrow an agreed draft article is in sight.

We have begun to discuss an area of disarmament which materially affects nearly every nation. Until the seventy-fourth meeting, on 24 August, we were talking about nuclear weapons and their vehicles, and those primarily concerned have been the major nuclear Powers. But the reduction of conventional armaments will concern almost all nations and opens up a new set of problems which, although not necessarily of global consequence, are very important to those countries which are immediately affected.

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We listened with attention to the remarks in that connexion of the representative of Czechoslovakia, who spoke immediately before I did. With respect, I think that he attributed to the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom an intention which cannot really be discovered in their statements. He seemed to think that, because those representatives recognized that conventional disarmament opened up some special and important problems for the smaller Powers, they therefore were saying that those smaller Powers should not necessarily concern themselves with the greater and more important problem of nuclear disarmament. I am sure that I can speak for my United States and United Kingdom colleagues in saying that that was not at all their intention.

To continue with the way in which the question of reduction of conventional armaments in the first and subsequent stages might affect the smaller Powers in the view of the Canadian delegation, we think that many nations in the second or third rank as military Powers will insist, and with justice, that their problems are unique and special. There is no evidence to show that the less militarily powerful nations on average display any greater sense of responsibility towards the world community than the major Powers, or that they are less disposed to protect their own special interests. It may prove to be the case that in the end the final time limits for disarmament will be set by the difficulty of securing the adhesion of the less powerful nations to a treaty.

The Defence Minister of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, perhaps had the same thought in mind when he said, on 24 July this year:

"There is one further matter I want to speak about before I come to general things. It is that we of the smaller countries are sometimes inclined to think, privately or publicly, that the devils in the disarmament business are the great countries. Very often it is said, 'If only the under-developed countries were more developed, there would be peace'. There is no indication that that is so. We must take equal responsibility and blame in this matter." (ENDC/PV.60, pp.13,14)

It has become clear in our discussion recently, in connexion both with the reduction of nuclear armaments, nuclear weapon vehicles, and of conventional armaments, that we face a major problem of definition: a problem of where to draw a line between the nuclear-capable and strictly conventional arms. As the Committee is well aware, that point is under dispute between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both of those major Powers appear to agree that there is a considerable range of armaments

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which has a dual capability and can be used to deliver both nuclear and high explosive warheads. Just how far down the scale of armaments that dual capability extends is known only to those countries actively engaged in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In theory, we understand, the lower limit can be very low indeed. But when practical utility and economy are taken into account there must be a limit somewhat above the theoretical minimum.

It follows therefore that it would be possible to draw a line of demarcation between nuclear and conventional arms. However, we do not agree that that is such a simple matter as the Soviet Union statements imply. Given the rapid advance of science and technology, can any line that is now drawn be held? I have no doubt that the nuclear Powers are constantly endeavouring to lower the weight and size to the yield ratios of their nuclear warheads. Is it possible to find definitions of military equipment, limiting its capabilities, which are sufficiently precise for incorporation in a treaty of the kind we hope to agree to here?

In the past that has not appeared feasible, due mainly to the fact that in past disarmament negotiations no limitation was placed on the development of new weapons. But that is not the present situation. At our sixty-sixth plenary meeting, on 6 August, the United States delegation introduced a re-draft (ENDC/30/Add.1) of that section in stage I of its plan which deals with the limitation on production of armaments and on related activities. Paragraph 2(c) of section A states "The testing and production of new types of armaments would be prohibited"; and paragraph 2(d) states "The expansion of facilities for the production of existing types of armaments and the construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types of armaments would be prohibited." From what the representative of the Soviet Union said on the matter of production at our seventy-fifth meeting (ENDC/PV.75) he seems to find the new United States position compatible with that of the Soviet Union.

I submit that with the new production proposals put forward by the United States the Committee could be confident that if a line of demarcation were drawn between what is and what is not a nuclear-capable weapon, or a vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear weapon, or the reverse, the relevant provisions could not later be evaded. If, from the beginning of the first stage, there is to be no further testing or production of new weapons, in theory it will not be possible to get around an agreed definition of certain armaments.

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If it is agreed that a line of demarcation can be drawn and held, which in turn depends on the effectiveness of control and verification measures, we would then have to decide where that line should be drawn. As I said previously, only the nuclear Powers know how far down the scale of armaments the nuclear capability exists in respect to their own particular armed forces. If, for example, the United States claimed that all tubed weapons of 5 inch calibre or more had the capability of firing a nuclear warhead but the Soviet Union claimed that only weapons of 7 inch calibre in its armoury had such a capability, where could the line be drawn? If the cut-off were agreed at 7 inch calibre weapons, the United States would be left with a nuclear delivery capability, whereas the Soviet Union would not. If the cut-off were made at 5 inch calibre weapons there would be, under the Soviet plan, little important armament to dispose of in the second and third stages.

The dilemma is complicated by the problem which will face the non-nuclear Powers. The arms inventories of many nations today include aircraft and artillery which, if owned by a nuclear Power, would be considered dual-capable weapons. For example, Sweden has a highly effective defensive aircraft which, if Sweden were a nuclear Power, would be considered as a nuclear delivery vehicle. The United Arab Republic has developed a rocket to which it could fit a nuclear warhead if it had one. I cite these facts merely by way of illustration and to point up the problem which would face the non-nuclear Powers if the nuclear Powers were to resolve their problems without giving full recognition to those of others.

Having posed the problem as my delegation sees it, I should like to mention certain factors we should take into account in searching for a solution. We shall make no progress if the Soviet delegation continues to insist that everything which could possibly be used as a nuclear delivery vehicle must be eliminated in the first stage. On the other hand, if we want to examine in the most general terms how to solve the problems of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles and conventional armaments, perhaps we may have to consider solutions other than the simple formula of across-the-board percentage reductions for all armaments and vehicles in all three stages.

If, for a final solution, it should be found necessary to draw a dividing line between those vehicles that could have an actual or potential nuclear capability and those which have not, as we have said, the way the dividing line is determined

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could affect the legitimate defence interests of the nations that do not possess nuclear armaments although disposing of significant conventional forces. That being so, the non-nuclear nations should have the opportunity to indicate the types of aircraft and rockets and the calibres of artillery which they would consider it justifiable for them to retain, in the first stage, and that should be taken into consideration in determining the dividing line between nuclear-capable and non-nuclear-capable.

If the non-nuclear nations included the most powerful weapons in their inventories, and the dividing line allowed such weapons to be retained, the nuclear Powers would retain some arms with a dual capability -- or a nuclear adaptability, to use a different phrase. But that, in my opinion, is inevitable anyway, for, as long as nuclear weapons are in existence improvised means for their delivery can be found. The method I have suggested of arriving at a dividing line would ensure that non-nuclear nations would not find themselves stripped of all effective armaments in the first or second stages and, furthermore, might facilitate the acceptance of an eventual treaty by those nations that are not represented at this table. I am aware that all this sounds rather complicated, but the problem is complicated, and this points to the desirability of detailed and careful study of it, with expert advice, when we resume our negotiations here in November.

In speaking on the topic of conventional arms reduction on 24 August the representative of the United States suggested (ENDC/PV.74, p.50) that a working committee be set up to consider the problem of the reduction of conventional arms in all its aspects. This suggestion we heartily endorse. We felt a glimmer of hope when we heard Mr. Kuznetsov say on 27 August:

"As Mr. Dean explained at our meeting on 24 August, the United States envisages, it appears, that 'only specified parties to the treaty' would be required to reduce their conventional types of armament in the first stage of disarmament, whereas 'some smaller parties to the treaty during stage I would be excluded from the requirement to reduce all their major armaments by 30 per cent.' What is behind this? Why should the United States be so concerned about the smaller countries,

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and how does the United States know that these smaller countries would not wish to reduce their conventional armaments in the first stage? Would it not be better to leave it to the smaller States to decide for themselves what they need to do to ensure their safety and independence?" (ENDC/PV.75, p.44)

I submit that that is precisely what the representative of the United States had in mind: an opportunity for those that are not major military Powers to study and digest the implications to themselves of the reduction in conventional armaments proposed in both outline plans.

I have said that I had a slight glimmer of hope that that suggestion would be agreed to, but it was dispelled when the Soviet representative later in the same statement rejected the possibility of a working group in terms that have become very familiar to this Committee. I cannot understand how the Soviet Union delegation can argue that any country should accept a political commitment in an area so vital to its security as disarmament, without first having detailed knowledge of the implications of that commitment. To take a political decision which accepts the Soviet thesis on disarmament without a full appreciation of its practicality is like signing a lease on a house without first agreeing to the rent. To use another analogy, the Soviet delegation in many of its proposals asks the rest of us to sign blank cheques. We hope that instead, when we resume, it will agree to join the rest of the delegations in expert study of the problems of disarmament where it is necessary. We feel that in that way we shall reach satisfactory solutions to some of the problems which now perplex us and to which no political agreement seems likely, and we shall find those solutions more quickly.

Before closing I should like to mention another aspect of the conventional armaments problem which has been raised by the representatives of India and Nigeria and which my delegation considers worthy of further attention. That subject is control over the distribution of conventional weapons. At the fifty-fourth meeting on 12 June the then Nigerian representative, Mr. Atta, said that most young countries

!..import their armaments from other countries. This will create some problems in limiting arms produced in each of the advanced States either at stage II or stage III of our disarmament programme. There



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might therefore be a strong case for the international disarmament organization to supervise the distribution of such arms centrally. There might also be a strong case for all armaments industries at stage III to be placed under public corporation. The purpose of these measures would be to ease the control issue." (ENDC/PV.54, p.39)

The Defence Minister of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, on 24 July, also emphasized the importance of measures for dealing with that problem. He said:

"....if the two great war blocs in the world could restrain themselves from the tendency, and what they consider to be the necessity, to distribute war weapons all round and bring greater and greater areas of the world into their zones, then the factors contrary to the possibility of disarming mentalities developing in smaller countries would be reduced."

(ENDC/PV.60, p. 14)

"When you have so many new nations in Africa and Asia, on account of their desire for self-preservation, or their desire that empires should not return to their places, or their fears of their neighbours, and this, that and the other, being assisted by one side or other of the warring groups, then, for all these reasons, military power is stepped up. And that stepping up takes place largely, as I have said, because it does not require sacrifices internally." (Ibid., p. 15)

The Canadian delegation believes that those statements demonstrate the importance of appropriate measures being introduced into the disarmament plan for the control of international distribution of arms. Such measures might help to some extent to reduce the danger of limited wars and, furthermore control of the distribution of conventional arms would go a long way towards ensuring that levels of arms agreed upon were in fact being maintained. We should like to suggest to the representatives of Nigeria and India that it would be valuable if they could develop their thoughts further so that they might be incorporated in the eventual treaty on general and complete disarmament which this Committee expects to produce.

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): This morning the representative of Burma has made what appear to be exceedingly sound and constructive suggestions. My delegation associates itself fully with those suggestions and hopes very sincerely that maximum use will be made of them by the nuclear Sub-Committee.

The announcement by President Kennedy at his latest Press conference of his proposal that agreement be reached on a cut-off date for the discontinuance of nuclear testing is indeed, in my humble opinion, a major assault on the seeming stalemate in our Conference. Equally important in the untiring efforts to find a solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear testing was the proposal made on 31 August by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, that the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should continue to meet during the period of the recess (ENDC/PV.77, p.38). That proposal is further proof of what appears to be the undaunted determination of the United States to find a solution to the problem and thus put an end to all nuclear testing in all environments.

It is the opinion of my delegation that the nuclear Powers are making obviously reasonable efforts to reach agreement, which would put an end to the hourly nightmare of tests to which humanity is at present subjected, were it not for the great distrust which still keeps the two blocs apart. It was to help bridge that gulf of distrust and create an atmosphere of confidence conducive to fruitful negotiations that my delegation submitted a few humble suggestions prior to and at the seventy-sixth plenary meeting. It is the sincere opinion of my delegation that, given the necessary good will and congenial atmosphere, agreement would be possible in a matter of a very few months. That is by no means unfounded or unsupported optimism. Sir Michael Wright, the representative of one of the Powers concerned, said, on 20 August, "The difference between the two sides is not wide, it is narrow." (ENDC/PV.72, p.5). The Soviet delegation has declared its readiness to come to an immediate agreement on the basis of the eight-Power memorandum. Above all, there was a tremendous sense of optimism implied in Mr. Dean's statement on 31 August when he indicated that it should be possible to reach agreement by 1 November (ENDC/PV.77, p.38).

It was with a view to the reaching of an early agreement on either a partial or a comprehensive test ban that my delegation made its recent constructive suggestions.

(Mr. Ibu, Nigeria)

In effect, at our sixty-second, sixty-eighth and seventy-sixth meetings my delegation asked -- and it still wonders -- whether it was too much to expect from all the nuclear Powers that they should desist from testing, no matter for how limited a period and how heavy the reservations attached. Is that too much to expect? The answer is no. It would produce the appropriate atmosphere and generate the necessary good will, as well as making it possible for the governments concerned to address themselves seriously to seeking either partial or full accord without being distracted by nuclear explosions carried out by themselves, their allies or their opponents.

My delegation believes that an agreement is both imperative and negotiable. Why? The answer is simple; Harold Urey's oft-repeated metaphor of 1945 is the answer. It is that:

"Atomic bombs do not land in the next block, leaving the survivors to thank their lucky stars and to hope that the next bomb will also miss them."

That explains our concern for the achievement of an early agreement ending all nuclear testing. The field of atomic weapons is the property of all nations. Our freedom and in fact the very essence of our existence as human beings are imperilled by nuclear explosions. The nuclear Powers, therefore, are not the only nations concerned with ending nuclear testing. The field of nuclear testing, a friend once remarked, is res communes. It is the property of all nations and therefore we have a right and a duty to have a say in the matter, because our own interests are unfortunately all too involved with nuclear explosions. Certainly nobody wants to live in a world devastated by a nuclear holocaust, a world in which the dead sigh with relief that it is all over, and the living understandably envy the dead.

On the shoulders and around the necks of the nuclear Powers, almost like a heavy weight of lead, lies the greatest responsibility to put an end to all tests in all environments for all time. My delegation has noted with satisfaction that the nuclear Powers appear to be fully conscious of that huge responsibility, as can be seen from the various statements of their leaders and from the letters exchanged between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. The new proposals of the Western Powers would in fact appear to be motivated by a deep sense of their responsibility in that field. When submitting the Western proposals (ENDC/58 and 59) on 27 August Mr. Dean declared:

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

"We, the nuclear Powers, have the capacity to protect or to destroy the peoples of all countries. We have, therefore, a compelling and an urgent responsibility to strive unceasingly to resolve our differences and to present to the world an effective agreement which can be signed just as soon as possible to ban all nuclear weapons tests." (ENDC/PV.75, p. 18)

That standpoint was endorsed by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, who spoke immediately after Mr. Dean, and declared:

"I suppose there is not one of us around this table, not one delegation or one representative, who is not conscious of the responsibilities which we bear in this Conference not only to our own countries but to the world. We have all of us been sent here to negotiate agreements acceptable not only to our own Governments but to the whole world community, both on general and complete disarmament and, in the same field, on nuclear weapons tests. In the same way, those of us from countries with nuclear capabilities have an especial responsibility to resolve our differences." (ibid.)

That being generally accepted, the question that naturally arises is how the threat of an atomic war can be removed. It could be achieved, of course, by reaching an acceptable agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests before it is too late. At his latest Press conference President Kennedy said what was in the minds of millions outside the United States; he expressed the feelings of millions who love peace and want to continue to live in a relatively peaceful world when he said: "Proliferation of nuclear weapons is a mortal peril to the United States and to the world." President Kennedy is of course right, and he addressed his remarks to the whole world and not only to the people of the United States.

Many words have been spoken and many appeals have been made to the nuclear Powers to move closer --- in the same and not in the opposite direction. The nuclear Powers will certainly gain rich dividends if they try hard to accommodate themselves by consciously electing to practise the game of "give and take". The rules of this game are simple; they are rules of compromise. Let them try to compromise over their remaining differences so that we can reach agreement on at least a partial test ban.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

I am saying that many appeals have been made to the nuclear Powers to find a common basis of agreement. I myself, on behalf of my delegation, voiced one such appeal as recently as at our seventy-sixth meeting, when I said:

"The nuclear Powers owe mankind a great obligation. That obligation which they owe demands a choice of risks. It is inescapable. It is imperative. The nuclear Powers must, therefore, choose that risk which promises best to break the present impasse and secure a partial tests ban treaty which will eventually pave the way for general and complete disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.76, p.44)

I said also:

"I am sure it is not asking too much to request the nuclear Powers to give serious consideration to the question of a moratorium on underground tests besides agreeing on a partial treaty on a test ban." (ibid.)

In sum, that was my appeal -- and I emphasize the word "appeal". "To request" -- and I call attention to that word too -- "the nuclear Powers to give consideration to the question of a moratorium on underground tests" was the essence of my appeal.

My appeal has been greeted with rather unexpected reaction. That is perhaps understandable in the present tussle between the West and the East. I should like to point out that my delegation did not, however, propose an uncontrolled, unpoliced and unmonitored moratorium. To suggest otherwise is rather embarrassing to my delegation. Also, to suggest that any delegation has been invited by my appeal to accept the risks of an unpoliced moratorium with respect to underground tests shows, I would submit with the greatest respect, a regrettable misunderstanding about the very essence of my appeal.

Comments made on my appeal tended to lay undue stress on what I did not say rather than on what I did say. My appeal in fact made two cardinal points. First, it repeated my earlier statement when I said:

"My Government would therefore be happy if a moratorium of some kind banning tests were agreed upon by the nuclear Powers pending the conclusion of a lasting agreement." (ENDC/PV.62, p.8)

Secondly, it merely confirmed the uncompromising opposition of my Government to all forms of nuclear testing. It did not spell out the nature of the moratorium. I merely said it could be voluntary, partial or conditional, and this indeed could be in terms of limitation both of duration and quality. But that is a matter

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

that the nuclear Powers themselves are the most competent to handle. The nuclear Powers, I submit, could address themselves profitably to this and other tasks in order to reach agreement on at least a partial test ban treaty. It was and still remains the understanding of my delegation, unless and until we are informed to the contrary, that neither of the draft treaties proposed by the Western nuclear Powers -- not even the partial test ban treaty (ENDC/59) -- was tabled on a "take it or leave it" basis. My delegation hopefully noted that that was twice underlined by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, who declared, when tabling the proposals:

"Neither of these offers is an ultimatum; neither offer is on the basis of 'take it or leave it'; both offers are negotiable." (ENDC/PV.75, p.21)

He added these words later:

"Both proposals are negotiable; neither proposal is an ultimatum; both proposals are new; and we are not only ready but anxious to sign either proposal or a negotiated version of it before the forthcoming recess."

(ibid., p.27)

I should like to draw particular attention to the key words in Mr. Godber's helpful statements just quoted -- "neither", "either", "negotiated version of it", etc. It is the hope of my delegation that the Committee will explore to the very limits and avail itself to the widest possible extent of the gleams of hope thrown out in Mr. Godber's most helpful statement in order to achieve at least a partial test ban treaty.

Nothing, however, will completely satisfy my delegation more than to see a complete agreement reached banning all nuclear tests. Let us therefore make the last supreme effort by honest and sincere as well as arduous negotiation guided by compromise. We could achieve a lot if we took up the eight-Power memorandum for all it is worth and made the most of it by clean and unambiguous arguments instead of trying to score debating points. It is, therefore, the sincere hope of my delegation that when the Sub-Committee meets during the recess, as proposed by the United States delegation, the eight-Power memorandum will receive the very serious consideration by the Sub-Committee which it deserves.

Mr. LALL (India): It seems to my delegation that a very striking fact has already emerged today in the statements which have been made. Those statements have been made by representatives from Asia, from Europe, from America and from Africa, and though some obviously were intended to deal with other aspects of our work than a ban on nuclear tests, all of them found it essential to address themselves to this question. We trust and hope that the nuclear Powers will draw from that fact the obvious conclusion, namely, that no statement can now be made in this Committee. It would seem, without bringing into focus the extremely urgent problem which is facing us as we approach our recess. Undoubtedly it is in all our minds that it is our duty to present to the world before we break up for the recess -- and if we cannot do it before we break up for the recess then to take steps so that we can do it at some future but very early date -- an agreement to ban nuclear tests. That is the feeling of this Committee; it is the feeling which is irrepressible in this Committee. It is essential -- and we plead with them to recognize this fact -- that the nuclear Powers should take that strong feeling into account and decide to take measures to stop all nuclear tests.

Those who have spoken and who have explored the various possibilities in this field have inevitably come to the conclusion that all nuclear tests must stop and that there is no way of dealing with the problem except by getting to that goal. A partial test ban would be valuable but it is not the solution. That has been pointed out, and various suggestions are before the nuclear Powers on what should be done. Indeed, without going into any details, I should like to mention that we are aware, as the nuclear Powers are aware, of the very constructive, very high level scientific discussions which have just taken place involving the scientists of both sides, and in which conclusions have been reached at the highest scientific levels which could indicate that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is achievable in the very near future and is achievable on the basis of all tests stopping by 1 January 1963.

We commend all those considerations, again with the utmost sincerity, to the nuclear Powers with the urgent request and appeal that they will come to a conclusion, taking into account what has been said here and also the very constructive recommendations of their own high-level scientists in this field.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I too have been led today, by the strong current that exists in this Committee, to talk on this subject, but it is not the main purpose of my brief intervention which I should like to submit now to the Committee.

I should like to ask a few questions with reference to the items before us in document ENDC/52, paragraph 5, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c). In asking these questions, I should like to make two or three points quite clear at the very outset. First, my questions are not to be taken as indicating a movement to one side or the other regarding the two plans before us. The delegation of India has frequently mentioned and has indicated in this connexion that the same view was stated by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, that the final treaty which we hope to sign on general and complete disarmament will not be either the United States plan or the Soviet Union plan, that we shall have to find a treaty which is acceptable to the two sides and which is acceptable on a wide basis to the world.

Secondly, we are trying to take into account that there has been a certain movement forward in the statements which have been made around this table and which do indicate that in spite of the fact, which we mention with great regret, that there has been no coming together at all on the crucial issues in general and complete disarmament -- I mean by that nuclear weapons and carriers of nuclear weapons, bases and the question of verification and control measures -- still there has been some probing and movement which has been helpful.

I shall come first to a few questions on item 5 (b) of the document before us -- that is to say, questions relating to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. These questions, I would say, are addressed to both sides. They may have more relevance to one side in a particular case than to the other, but all the questions -- I believe that there are about twelve of them -- which I shall ask today are questions to both sides. I should like to say before I ask them that one could ask many more questions, but I have tried to restrict the number to a short list of twelve because even the appetite of the most ready responder to questions is limited at any given time.

My first question is this. On the question of delivery vehicles, while one side proposes to treat such vehicles as an integral part of the armaments to be reduced percentage-wise rather than as a distinct and separate category, that same side has asked the other side more than once for a list of delivery systems which



(Mr. Lall, India)

it would include in this category. Does that mean that if such a list were furnished the matter could be dealt with on the basis of that list? I want to make it clear that I do not mean that it should be dealt with in a particular stage; but could it be dealt with -- when it is dealt with and in such manner as might be agreed -- on the basis of the list which has been asked for?

My second question is as follows. In this connexion the delegation of India had previously suggested that the problem posed by the issue of delivery vehicles could perhaps be brought nearer a widely acceptable solution if the two sides could agree to treat certain delivery systems as qualifying for attention under this heading. Such an agreed list would, of course, include all delivery systems specifically meant for nuclear weapons and any other agreed systems which could be so deployed with important strategic results. Could not such a list be drawn up -- that is to say, an agreed list of what would constitute vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons -- and, if so, when could it be drawn up?

This is my third question. We have been informed in this Committee that agreement to a separate item -- that is, paragraph 5(b) of document ENDC/52 -- was explained to the other side as in no way being a commitment to deal with delivery systems for nuclear weapons as a separate category. We should like to ask whether a similar explanation was given when the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) was worked out and a separate item, namely item 3, was written out for this matter as one of the points in the five-point programme for general and complete disarmament.

I now come to my fourth question, which seeks some clarification. The inclusion of the question of delivery systems as a separate question in the joint statement, which is the basic document for consideration of general and complete disarmament measures, seems to be borne out by certain very recent publications -- and I should like to stress the words "very recent" because, obviously, modern developments can make this matter more complicated almost at each moment. In this connexion I would draw attention to the publication Foreign Affairs of July 1962, and in particular to a certain part of an interesting article entitled "The Unsolved Problems of European Defence" by Mr. Kissinger. In that article he says the following on page 539:

"However, if we decide to be more forthcoming with respect to the French atomic programme, if only by aiding the development of delivery vehicles," --

(Mr. Lall, India)

I repeat that: "if only by aiding the development of delivery vehicles" --

"we would have a right to insist that the resources thus saved be used to strengthen the conventional shield of NATO."

I am not, obviously, taking any issue with Mr. Kissinger on NATO problems, but I should like to point out here two thoughts in this part of Mr. Kissinger's article. One is the distinction between the conventional shield of NATO and the non-conventional armaments of NATO; and the other is -- and he argues this at some length in his article -- that perhaps the Western Powers should aid, or rather, the United States should aid, the French in the development of delivery vehicles. This is rather confusing because we are told sometimes around this table that it is extremely difficult to define delivery vehicles for atomic weapons. However, a very knowledgeable person such as Mr. Kissinger seems to have a pretty clear idea in his mind of what constitutes delivery vehicles for atomic weapons. I should like to say that, in view of all these considerations, we would again ask whether it would not be possible, with a list agreed by the two sides, to deal with this matter possibly as a category of weapons for disarmament, which would be, it would seem to us, the sense of paragraph 3(c) of the joint statement of agreed principles, which reads: "Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;" (ENDC/5, p.2)

Now I come to my fifth question. It is asserted, and I think it might be agreed, that nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are qualitatively different from other weapons. Could it not be agreed, therefore, that the quality of control and verification should be of a higher order in regard to the verification of elimination of these weapons and their delivery systems so that there should be the necessary high order of assurance that such elimination had taken place. In other words, we are suggesting that it might be considered that a higher degree of assurance through verification measures would be required in this field than in the field of conventional weapons, and we would ask what suggestions the two sides would make in this regard -- that is to secure the necessary high order of verification required to give us the assurance that there are no more vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons in existence.

In this connexion we draw attention to an earlier suggestion of our own, that it should be agreed that the weight of control measures should be heavier in the territories of nuclear Powers and their allies than in other countries. We should like to know whether consideration has been given to that suggestion.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Now I turn to a few questions related to point 5(c) in document ENDC/52. They deal mainly with production of armaments and we try to take into account the movement of the two sides regarding this field.

My first question here is: would it not be possible to stop all production and developments of armaments, including spares, in the first stage of the disarmament plan? All production to be stopped, including spares, so that every unit of production is closed down in stage I.

My second question: if the answer to my previous question cannot be in the affirmative for some reason, would it not be possible to stop all production and development except of agreed quantities of spares but not including provision for replacement of obsolete units or completely destroyed units, for example, aircraft crashed and lost or armaments of low-fire power which are no longer considered to be of value?

I should like to explain that those two questions are based on the evidently sound postulate that it is logical that when disarmament commences any build-up of armaments would be basically a countervailing force to disarmament measures and therefore would not be permitted.

I come now to my third question on production. It is this: would not total cessation of production of armaments simplify rather than complicate the necessary control of verification measures?

Fourthly: could not the two sides, and indeed all parties to the treaty, declare at the beginning of stage I all their production facilities for armaments, and would it not be possible for the international disarmament organization broadly to check such declarations against other known or ascertainable facts, for example, by taking the number of tanks in a particular army and then assessing whether the facilities declared for each category of tanks in the overall number bore a reasonable relationship to the tank quota in the army?

My fifth question: could not the international disarmament organization then go on to see by verification on site that all such production facilities were either dismantled or effectively converted to peaceful purposes?

Sixth: in the case of units previously producing armaments and then converted to peaceful purposes, could not the international disarmament organization be furnished with statements relating to the peaceful production activities of the units so converted, and could it not be agreed that the international disarmament

(Mr. Lall, India)

organization could and would exercise continuing control on an agreed basis to ensure that production remained peaceful?

Seventh: could it not also be agreed that if the international disarmament organization had reason to suspect that there were units for production of armaments other than those declared and dismantled or reconverted it would be able to go and visit the suspected plant or specified point or points at which such production facilities were suspected to exist? That means, in other words, could it not be agreed that the international disarmament organization could have powers of inspection at given points if there was some evidence to show that there was the possibility of concealed production of armaments taking place at those points?

Those are the questions, and I would add only that it might be possible to relate these questions to all production of conventional weapons and the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

So far as the production of nuclear warheads is concerned, it would have to be agreed in which stage -- whether the first or the second or the third -- the whole nuclear industry would be brought under control, but it would seem to us that the questions which we have asked would be relevant to all other production and would be relevant to disarmament measures in the first stage of the disarmament plan.

Mr. ALAMAYEHU (Ethiopia): The long negotiations extending over five months in search of agreement on general and complete disarmament, cessation of nuclear weapon tests and some collateral measures to ease tension in the world are now about to stop for some time because of the Conference recess starting on 8 September. With regard to general and complete disarmament my delegation has already given its views that without an agreed common criterion for the various disarmament measures to be undertaken in the three stages, particularly in the first stage, we would not be able to make any progress towards our goal, and I do not deem it necessary to say anything more on that today.

I would therefore limit my remarks to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, and in doing so I should say at the outset that my delegation appreciates the move made by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August in submitting their two draft treaties (ENDC/58 and 59) on a nuclear weapon test ban -- one comprehensive, the other partial. The authors of the two drafts, the representatives of the two great Western Powers, have assured us that they were

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

prompted to make that move by a genuine desire to arrive at a solution of the great problem facing humanity, and that the drafts are not presented on a "take it or leave it" basis but are negotiable. We therefore appreciate and welcome both the motives and the statements of the two delegations.

Of particular importance to my delegation -- and I am sure to all delegations, as well as to the world at large -- are the statements of the Soviet and United States delegations that nuclear weapon tests in all environments should cease at the end of this year, as suggested by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, some months ago (ENDC/PV.34, p.16). As a result of those statements by the nuclear Powers on the cessation of testing by the end of this year, or by the beginning of next year, it seems to my delegation that two important points logically follow. The first point is that the negotiators, to remove the remaining differences and to achieve agreement before the time fixed to end testing, should adopt the most appropriate and least controversial method of work. The second point is that if, despite such efforts, agreement could not be achieved by the time fixed to end testing, then the possibility of making those statements -- the statements that have been made -- a joint pledge by the nuclear Powers not to conduct nuclear tests after the end of this year and until agreement is achieved might be given consideration.

Much has been said about the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28), and I think I have to say something about it myself today. The eight nations concerned, and all other nations not represented here, are very much interested -- perhaps even more interested than the nuclear Powers themselves -- in seeing an end to nuclear testing. But why? To this question I would quote, in reply, the Chairman of the Tenth Assembly of the World Health Organization when he said, as far back as 1957, that the greatest danger from radiation in the nuclear age might come in the underdeveloped regions of the world which were not fully prepared to cope with it; those countries still had much to do in handling the vast health problems of the day and did not yet realize the danger of contamination of soil, water, air and food. The danger of radiation did not stop at their frontiers.

At our thirty-fourth meeting, on 9 May, the representative of India, Mr. Lall, quoting the United States scientist, Professor Pauling, told us that as a result of the September series of Soviet tests and the April series of United States tests the human race, in terms of genetic damage, would "reap a total of 20 million grossly defective children and embryonic neo-natal deaths." (ENDC/PV.34, p.34) We are

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certain that as a result of the current Soviet test series this already gloomy picture of what mankind is reaping out of this mad and senseless competition of testing will be even more grim in future.

It is therefore against this background, and to assist the nuclear Powers to get out of their difficulties, that my delegation, with seven other delegations, has co-sponsored the memorandum which is known today by the name of the "eight-Power memorandum." Each and every one of the eight delegations sponsoring that memorandum has reiterated, and I reiterate now, that they would be happy to accept any interpretation placed upon the memorandum by the nuclear Powers provided such interpretations carry them forward to achieving agreement to ban nuclear testing; nor do they object to an agreement reached between the nuclear Powers banning nuclear testing in whatever way or by whatever means such agreement is achieved. But where there is disagreement on any proposal we would urge upon the nuclear Powers that the eight-Power memorandum is the best possible way out of the difficulty. From the experience acquired in the long negotiations on these questions the eight-Power memorandum has been the only compromise formula which has brought the two positions closer together, and we believe that with some further mutual efforts the remaining differences would be removed on the basis of that memorandum.

The eight-Power memorandum was offered to the nuclear Powers with an earnest hope and a desire on the part of the sponsors that it would break the deadlock which had existed in the test ban negotiations for some time. It was not offered because there was a lack of proposals from both sides -- in fact, there have been many proposals made by each side regarding this question in the course of the long and protracted negotiations extending over many years; but such proposals offered by one side have always proved to be unacceptable to the other side, thus rendering all efforts made so far fruitless. It was therefore not only to serve as a compromise between the two positions, but also to assist each side to accept what it considers fair without such acceptance being taken by anyone as a political or psychological victory of the other side, that the eight-Power memorandum was offered by the sponsors on 16 April last.

Whether we like it or not, whether we admit it or not, it is unfortunately true in the West-East relationship prevailing today that even an innocent and fair proposal

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

if offered by one side is apt to arouse suspicion and every possible speculation as to its intent and purpose in all sections of the population of the other side. The acceptance or rejection of such a proposal of one side by the other side is generally interpreted in terms of victory or defeat, as the case may be.

The eight-Power memorandum, therefore, coming as it does from the non-aligned countries which have no other interest than to see agreement reached banning nuclear tests, apart from being a compromise, has an added advantage inasmuch as it is a proposal to be considered and judged on its own merit without arousing any possible suspicion or speculation about its intent and purpose. Then the memorandum has proved its usefulness because it has enabled the parties to narrow down the differences which hitherto existed between their positions.

As the representative of Sweden has most ably shown at our last meeting, the United States and the United Kingdom have now accepted nationally-manned observation, detection and identification stations -- national stations -- if internationally supervised; and the Soviet Union has accepted the idea of an international scientific commission. The only remaining substantive difference between the two sides is therefore the question of on-site inspection. Even that remaining difference, namely the difference in regard to on-site inspection, the principle of which is accepted by the Soviet Union, seemed to have reached its vanishing point when the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, after quoting Mr. Tsarapkin extensively (ENDC/PV.34, pp.48,49), said in confirmation:

"Is it not clear from this explanation and from this reference to the official statement of the Soviet Government that we agree that it will be possible in individual cases to invite scientists, members of the international commission, to ascertain in loco the nature of the events which are in doubt." (ibid.p. 49)

Those were the words of Mr. Zorin, words which were confirmed many times here by the leader of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Kuznetsov. From those words it seems to the Ethiopian delegation that there is no substantive difference between the two sides as far as the principle of on-site inspection is concerned. The difference seems to us to arise in relation to how or in what form such on-site inspection would take place -- whether it would be in the form of optional or mandatory invitation. In other words, the difference seems to be not one of substance but one of form.

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

If so, would it be difficult for the delegations of the two sides to agree on some form, even of a temporary nature, to remove this small difference and to stop all tests in all environments, without such agreement being prejudicial or creating any precedent as regards the basic positions of the two sides relative to the principle of inspection in general?

Such a temporary arrangement, creating no precedent and prejudging no position maintained by either side in regard to the principle of inspection, would, I believe, have a number of advantages.

First, it being itself a temporary arrangement, it could be replaced by a permanent agreement as soon as such permanent agreement was reached through negotiations. Secondly, it would create no precedent, nor would it prejudge the positions of the parties in regard to certain principles which they consider vital for their national security. Thirdly, unlike a voluntary moratorium, it would have, for its duration, binding international obligation on the parties not to conduct tests. Fourthly, if such an arrangement were to work successfully, we are sure that it would create confidence between the parties, which is necessary for agreement on the much more complicated problems of disarmament in general. We believe that the delegations of the nuclear Powers can agree to remove this remaining small difference between them through give-and-take in a negotiation, and that all the necessary elements for accommodating the respective positions and preoccupations of the parties and facilitating such agreement are provided for in the eight-Power memorandum.

From all that has been said, the difference between the two positions on the question of a nuclear test ban treaty, unlike that in regard to general and complete disarmament, does not seem to be so wide to bridge, provided there is good will and determination on both sides. That fact has been recognized and repeated so many times in statements made here by many delegations including those from East and West. An agreement on a test ban treaty or treaties is therefore a test case for the genuine desire and determination of the nuclear Powers to bring an end to the dangerous situation prevailing in the world today. For if they failed to agree to remove the small difference that separates them from signing a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments it would be difficult to say with confidence that they would agree to sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament.



(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

I should like to quote an extract from the most interesting statement of the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, on 3 August 1962. He said:

"What makes a rational answer impossible is that the world knows that nuclear tests are very much easier to detect and to identify than armaments. With the possible exception of the smallest underground tests, whose military value seems doubtful, nuclear tests have a habit of announcing themselves. If, with that tremendous advantage, we are unable to put an end to nuclear tests for ever, it is difficult to see how we can hope to make any progress towards general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.65, p.15)

I share that preoccupation. We have seen and heard many statements by the leaders and representatives of both East and West that their countries are sincerely desirous of seeing the arms race stopped, general and complete disarmament accomplished and the world saved from thermonuclear catastrophe. Only the other day the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, said: "If we do not stop testing altogether we may stop human progress altogether." (ENDC/PV.75, p.5) If that is so, if the nuclear Powers are really anxious to stop testing, if they are sincerely desirous of stopping the armament race, if they are genuinely anxious to save mankind and its civilization from thermonuclear catastrophe, as they say they are, then let them demonstrate that sincere desire, that genuine anxiety, to the world by signing a treaty or treaties banning nuclear weapon tests once and for all. Their differences in regard to reaching agreement on a test ban treaty, as I have said, are not so great that they cannot be removed through mutual efforts. All the essential elements facilitating agreement are provided for by the eight-Power memorandum. It is only their good will and their determination which are necessary to accomplish that great task. The great nuclear Powers have, therefore, an excellent opportunity now to show to the anxious world that they really share that anxiety with the peoples of the world.

Because of the hurdle with which we are confronted with regard to the methods of control for underground tests, and animated by the desire to achieve all that can be achieved short of this comprehensive test ban, my delegation has joined other non-aligned delegations seated at this table in urging the nuclear Powers to consider as

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a first step the possibility of agreement on the cessation of tests in those environments where the measures are less controversial and hence easier to agree upon. The alternative plan (ENDC/59) submitted jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States is, as we have heard from its authors, intended to achieve that goal.

However, from the discussions that have taken place so far, both in the Sub-Committee and at the three past meetings of this Committee, we are afraid we have still to do more spade-work before we realize even a partial accord. In this connexion, we have followed attentively the statements of both parties so as to inform ourselves fully of their views on the points that still remain to be resolved. We note also with a sense of relief that a meeting of the Sub-Committee is scheduled to consider the possibility of partial agreement and we urge the nuclear Powers to persist in their effort to reach agreement at least on partial measures. My delegation refuses to acknowledge that possibilities for reaching an accord have been exhausted. On the contrary, we believe that those possibilities exist and, moreover, that the difficulties to be overcome are fewer than ever.

Let us always remember that the nuclear Powers owe a tremendous responsibility to the world: the responsibility to rid it of the nuclear nightmare. Until that responsibility is fulfilled we deny to them the right to say: "We can go only this far and no farther."

Mr. CASTRO (Brazil): We are moving towards the end of this second round of meetings of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. The delegation of Brazil was not in favour of a recess in our proceedings, which, in our opinion, should progress on a basis of continuity until we are in a position to fulfil the commitments assigned to us under the terms of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) of 3 January 1962. That resolution recommends:

"that the Committee, as a matter of the utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles ... agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control" --

No more and no less. It is, therefore, the considered opinion of the Brazilian delegation that, barring any decision of the General Assembly to the contrary, our

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mandate will not expire until we are in a position to report such agreement on the crucial matter of disarmament. That is our responsibility and, I dare say, a most sobering one. Until our mandate expires we should be very frugal and self-restraining in the matter of taking recesses.

Disarmament is a central problem -- a "problem of problems", as it has been described. Fundamentally it is a problem of power, and traditionally problems of power have been settled by the interplay and interaction of power itself. That, in spite of so many disquieting factors and elements in the world situation, we are proceeding along the lines recommended by the General Assembly is in itself a political fact of paramount importance which should not be disregarded. It shows that reason and realism have not abdicated their claim to have a say in regard to this tormented situation of mankind, faced with the dire prospects of destruction and annihilation in the nuclear age. Our work is thus based on the assumption that reason will prevail and the most powerful nations are moving towards forgoing the use of force or the threat of force in the settlement of their differences. Regardless of the progress achieved -- and the past five months have not been particularly encouraging -- the continued functioning of a disarmament body is indicative of a joint determination not to accept failure. As we once pointed out, this is a matter on which we cannot afford to lose hope. We have little else left but hope, and we are not going to part with it.

We should be careful neither to overestimate nor to underestimate what has been accomplished in the proceedings of our Committee since 14 March. On the positive side we can say we have the assurance that both sides are in earnest when they say they are really prepared to disarm provided they do not feel threatened in their own security. In this connexion, Brazil is prepared to receive those statements on their face value; if such were not the case we would consider our work as futile or sterile.

We are convinced that disarmament is today the overriding preoccupation of all the great Powers, that they are in earnest about it and that only mutual fear and an appalling lack of mutual confidence prevent their enlarging their area of agreement on the issues with which we have dealt in these past months. As a matter of fact, we have reached a paradoxical situation in which it is the most powerful nations that feel the most insecure and vulnerable. Power has not added to security, and the needs of security are now definitely interlinked with the cause of peace.

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As I have said, the disarmament problem is a central one, and all other political problems are contained in that, so to speak, spectrum problem. Compared to disarmament any political problem, even one which is uppermost in our minds today, such as the problem of Berlin, say, is relatively easy to settle because in any given settlement each of the sides would have a rough idea what it was giving and what it was taking, and also because any present solution might not prove to be a permanent one if the means were retained to change it ultimately. In the case of disarmament any step that might upset the balance of power might be irreversible. We state those facts not to justify the reluctance of the great Powers to come to an agreement on the issues of general and complete disarmament but to view our proceedings in a realistic light and a proper focus. Constructive pessimism and tempered optimism should, in our opinion, determine our approach to the problem; in this field we should avoid both despair and daydreaming.

What have we accomplished so far? That is an apt question to raise now when all of us, including General Burns, are about to leave Geneva for several weeks. The question is being raised by public opinion and is addressed particularly to the members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. Not much, I admit, besides an agreement on some paragraphs of a preamble to an eventual treaty, and certain Conference documents bristling with forbidding brackets.

Still on the negative side, we cannot fail to mention that the great Powers have not succeeded in refraining from polemics and acrimony to cover up their reluctance -- I do not mean their unwillingness -- to come to agreement on the several issues. That accounts for the technique, often resorted to, of stating positions which all know are entirely unacceptable to the other side so as to secure the maximum advantage in propaganda. That point was stressed in Brazil's first statement (ENDC/PV.3, p.7), made by Professor San Thiago Dantas on 16 March, to this very Committee. It is due to the fact that at the same time as we are sitting in Geneva in this common endeavour a cold war is in full blast in all corners of the world -- a war mostly of semantics, a war of words, which are losing their former value and becoming depreciated in the course of those verbal encounters. Polemics, acrimony and propaganda are certainly, to say the least, of no value, and are no help to our proceedings. It is no easy task to hold disarmament talks when our

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ears are deafened by the explosion of nuclear weapons and by the explosion of polemics in the various battlefields of the cold war. Yet it is a task that has to be accomplished even in such unfavourable circumstances.

On the other hand, progress towards disarmament cannot be measured accurately by the length of texts agreed upon or even by the sometimes diversified meaning of words and expressions. We are in the middle of a political process which we hope will not be a very lengthy one, since we are running against time and time is running short. Both for the Committee and for mankind. Our work is of course conditioned by political events, which inevitably reverberate in this room, and rightly so because we are not an academic body dealing with problems in the abstract, in a vacuum, but a political body dealing with hard and unpleasant realities. We may sometimes cover a lot of ground only to see our efforts nullified by a new upsurge of political problems arising from well-known points of friction, and we may at other times be confronted with a stalemate, which will be settled by the advent of some favourable circumstances leading to relaxation of tensions.

This line of reasoning led the Brazilian delegation not to oppose the idea of a recess although, as I have said, we were not in favour of it. On the other hand, this is not meant to imply that work on disarmament should be contingent on the vicissitudes of the cold war, since the acceleration of the arms race, which we are pledged to stop, is the main cause of the exacerbation of tensions. An effort towards disarmament, with all its difficulties and shortcomings, is the most effective way of trying to curb and reverse the cold war spiral.

In our opinion, the presence of eight delegations from countries not involved in the cold war has proved a positive asset to the disarmament effort. Those nations do not constitute a political bloc although they have acted on some occasions since 14 March as a diplomatic bloc in trying to reconcile antagonistic positions and in advancing proposals, suggestions and ideas likely to facilitate agreement. We are glad to see that the constructive role played by the eight nations which to a certain extent represent the non-armed and non-nuclear world is now properly evaluated by public opinion and by the other members of the Committee on Disarmament. We venture to say that the need for mediation is now an added and acquired principle in the effort towards disarmament and that we should not revert to the old position of direct, untempered confrontation of the two opposite sides.

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

Sitting around this table during the past five months we have listened to the exhaustive presentation of the two draft treaties submitted to this Committee. As representatives of a country which fortunately has never had to give individual consideration to the problems of the cold war and the nuclear age we have made an effort to evaluate the serious explanations the two sides have put forward as regards their security needs. Strategic evaluations, discussions on the significance of nuclear weapons and detailed data on the meaning of each measure of disarmament have been put before us in a manner which has enriched our experience and added considerably to our information. Each individual plan, each individual proposal, advanced by the great Powers is the product of the co-ordinated thinking of large segments of their intelligentsia. Scientists, soldiers, diplomats, people from every stratum of social life, help in the formulation of the positions of those Powers. We have tried to digest the considerable amount of data and information, and those data and that information have confirmed us in our belief that disarmament cannot be dealt with in an emotional or lighthearted way. We have learned a lot, and by so doing have realized that we still have to keep listening in order to be able to give the great Powers the serious, sound collaboration they have the right to expect from us. My delegation is gratified that it has been able to collaborate closely in this regard with the delegations of Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, to which we are indebted for unfailing help and assistance. We hope sincerely to extend our field of mutual collaboration in the months ahead when we shall be called upon for a renewed appraisal of the problem.

In stressing our collaboration with the seven it is not my intention to single out any contribution. We feel that all nations represented here are moved by a sincere desire for peace and are convinced that all possible efforts should be made towards general and complete disarmament under effective control. We do not question their motives and we respect their preoccupations and their arguments. Each of those nations has made a valuable contribution to our proceedings, and anyway our responsibility is a joint responsibility to the General Assembly. What is more, we do not feel that any nation or any group of nations -- nuclear or non-nuclear, aligned or non-aligned, committed or uncommitted, engaged or unengaged -- holds a monopoly on truth or a monopoly on peace. Apart from the reference we have made to their respective delegations, I think we would be less than fair if we failed to

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express our appreciation for the painstaking and relentless efforts of our co-Chairmen in securing the normal and smooth operation of this Conference. We sometimes disagreed with them, but when we did so we disagreed with them so as to give them more time and another opportunity to reach agreement between themselves.

It is only proper that during the approaching recess we should search our minds with a view to ascertaining whether some procedural changes should not be introduced in our work so as to ensure a maximum of efficiency. In this connexion my delegation feels that we should ponder the wise words delivered at the plenary meeting of 24 August by Mr. Alamayehu, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia. We totally share his view that the present procedural arrangement of single and double brackets on the several issues of disarmament --

"... will not possibly bring us any nearer even to narrowing down the basic differences between the two positions on major issues of substance, let alone to reaching agreements and concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.74, p.16)

Our problem, I submit, is not a problem of drafting. Our problem is a problem of substance, not of form. We need agreement, not brackets. And I fear that if words between brackets were now removed from the few working papers of this Conference very little indeed would be left.

I wish to make another point. My delegation has consistently stated that we should never minimize the problem of control, which we find essential to and inherent in any measure of disarmament. Although there is diversity of opinion between the great Powers not only as to the method, the nature and the timing of control to be established, and although those differences also refer to the emphasis to be given to control as compared to the actual process of disarmament -- and many good and valid reasons could be advanced in support of either position -- we feel it is absolutely correct to say that no great Power will commit itself to disarm unless and until it is satisfied that its security is safeguarded by an effective system of control which will ensure the implementation of the concrete measures agreed to. This question is a basic one and there is no evading or minimizing the issue, if we are determined to proceed on the road to disarmament. Mr. de Mello-Franco dwelt exhaustively on this matter in his statements of 8 May and 12 June before this Committee. I quote his words:

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"I shall begin by examining fundamentals of the control problem. The discussions which have taken place here and the reflections of each individual give the impression that control is both a political and a technical process. This preliminary conclusion is important because of the consequences that follow from it. For if we attach too much importance to the political aspects of control and neglect its technical aspects, we run the risk of finding, after the successful conclusion of political negotiations, that we cannot implement the decisions reached, because in the absence of technical preparation for control the results cannot be achieved within the stipulated time. Conversely, if we lose ourselves in the complexities of technical discussions on control we shall hold up the progress of the political negotiations, without which no treaty on general and complete disarmament can be concluded. In our view, the political aspect of control merges with the actual negotiation of the disarmament treaty and is thus necessarily an essential issue at this Conference; but the technical aspect of control can, and to a certain extent even must, be the subject of scientific studies parallel to the work of this Conference, though they can, of course, be carried out under its auspices and supervision." (ENDC/PV.54, p.23)

In that statement of 12 June, enlarging on an idea already broached in his statement of 18 May, Mr. de Mello-Franco advanced a suggestion to set up a technical committee of experts to study the various aspects of the problem of control, so as to provide the Conference with a solid and concrete factual basis for the evaluation of the political problems involved. I quote again from his remarks:

"The delegation of Brazil considers that the most logical and natural solution would be to form a corps of experts who, without intervening in the political discussions of the Conference, could provide it with the material foundations necessary for the progress of its deliberations. Informal contact, without any commitment, between the technical advisers of the delegations, as Ambassador Lall suggested in one of his recent statements, might be a tentative first step towards the formation of such a group." (ibid., p.31)



(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

It is not my intention to insist on this matter today, at this stage of our proceedings in this second round of meetings, but I wish to place on record that we still feel the advisability of the establishment of an expert group on control should be examined and given serious consideration by the Committee, when it reconvenes in November, for political decisions on disarmament and control cannot be worked out in a technical vacuum.

My delegation regrets that the Committee of the Whole should have met just once in this second round of meetings, and at our informal meeting of 22 August we made an inquiry on that matter. The Committee of the Whole deals with questions of the utmost importance and cogency. We share the feeling of other delegations to the effect that while we do not reach our goal of having a general treaty on disarmament implemented it is imperative that we reach an immediate agreement on the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, prevention of war by accident, miscalculation and failure in the system of communications. Like the test ban issue, those are immediate issues on which we should act forthwith, as they are the ones with a more direct bearing on the possibility of a conflict and consequently of the destruction of the human race.

For all the reasons we have advanced -- to which others could be added -- it is our firm belief that the goal sought by this Conference, besides being one on which the hopes of mankind are concentrated, is a clearly attainable one. We all acknowledge none the less that we are not on the verge of securing the general and complete disarmament which is our global objective, as we well know that not one of the substantial issues has yet been agreed upon. If we are to proceed indefinitely with the enunciation of the opposing points of view of the great Powers on particular points of their respective draft plans, this sterile tournament will go on for an indefinite time. While no grounds for agreement are found in the approach to this problem we might suggest that in a parallel effort some specific questions should be dealt with in such a manner as to prepare us for the day when they may be made to fit into any compromise solutions found for the substantial questions referred to. The problem of control might well be one of those questions; studies of military expenditures, according to the administrative system of each country, might be another.

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

We now come to the test ban issue, which has been the subject of frequent and very often repetitive statements by the delegation of Brazil. Our reasons for an almost obsessive insistence on this point are two-fold: first, we think that the unchecked continuation of nuclear tests is a war waged against the very dignity of man and, as Mrs. Myrdal so forcefully described them, "abominable rehearsals" (ENDC/PV.64, p.7) of war; secondly, we feel that an agreement on a test ban is a prerequisite to any serious consideration of the disarmament problem. It appears that we are reaching a consensus on this point, which has been stressed by several delegations; and I, for my part, have not heard any ideas to the contrary. We have also said, on various occasions, that world public opinion cannot take seriously our efforts on the drafting of an eventual treaty on general and complete disarmament if we cannot so much as reach agreement on the more direct and clear-cut issue of a cessation of nuclear tests. That is why we have always been prepared -- and are still prepared -- to give this issue absolute priority over all other issues under consideration.

At our plenary meeting of 16 April, Brazil, on behalf of the eight unaligned nations, submitted a joint memorandum (ENDC/28) which had been elaborated with the purpose of providing the nuclear Powers with fresh and constructive elements that would make it possible for them to break the deadlock which they had reached through the impact of their respective positions on the problem of control over nuclear tests. The drafting of such a document, from the initial form in which it was conceived up to the final wording in which it was submitted, demanded from the eight co-sponsors long negotiations and mutual concessions, similar to those which the eight nations ventured to expect from the nuclear Powers. As a consequence of mutual concessions made, and also in order to provide a wider basis for negotiations between the parties concerned, the text of the joint memorandum did not aim at an abundance of details or at technical precision. As the representative of Ethiopia said, the document was never envisaged by the eight Powers as "a blueprint for a treaty" (ENDC/PV.24, p.5). That is why, at our meeting of 17 August, we strongly objected to the "courtroom debate" (ENDC/PV.71, p.15), so to speak, and the sterile discussions on the exact interpretation to be given to a certain section, paragraph or sub-paragraph of the document.

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

In an official note (ENDC/PV.67, p.24) of 6 August, in terms similar to those used in a document on the United States explosions in the Pacific, the Government of Brazil, in condemning the new Soviet series of nuclear tests, declared that it did not disregard the preoccupation of any Power with the problems of its own security. We do not believe that any agreement which one side feels would be to the detriment of its own security should be imposed upon it, however strong the diplomatic pressure applied; and this, of course, is the only kind of pressure which the non-nuclear nations are in a position to apply.

Nothing that is said in this Committee or elsewhere can shift us from our view that the joint memorandum is wide enough and flexible enough to serve as a rallying point for the divergent positions. And in this connexion I agree 100 per cent with what was said today by the representatives of Burma, Nigeria and Ethiopia, and what was stressed on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77) by the representative of Sweden. We view that joint memorandum and the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) of 20 September 1961 as the two most constructive documents which have emerged from the disarmament talks in the last twelve months. As we have stated, we continue to hope that negotiations and mutual concessions will materialize so that the eight nation memorandum will be transformed into an eighteen nation memorandum -- and, I would add here, seventeen may not be enough -- so that the ominous nuclear tests of today will be filed among the reminiscences of an uncivilized past.

On the question of a nuclear test ban my delegation has made some practical suggestions which may be relevant to further debate on the issue. We addressed a question to the nuclear Powers on the possibility of concentrating their efforts on atmospheric, outer space and underwater tests, which do not appear to present problems of control. At our plenary meeting of 25 July (ENDC/PV.61, p.36) we submitted that question as a procedural one with a bearing on the proceedings of the Sub-Committee on Nuclear Tests, and we repeated it at our plenary meeting of 17 August (ENDC/PV.71, p.16) since, during the three intervening weeks, no answer or elucidation was forthcoming from the nuclear Powers.

In this connexion, we have welcomed the new United Kingdom-United States position on the ban of atmospheric, outer space and underwater tests as it appears now that agreement prevails that control machinery is not a necessity for tests of that nature.

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

While continuing to strive for a comprehensive test ban treaty, although we do not minimize the importance of underground tests as an accelerating factor in the armaments race, we would be gratified if something could be worked out immediately with regard to atmospheric and outer space tests, which are the most dangerous, actually and potentially, to the human race.

Of course, we are confronted with a new stalemate among the great Powers and we are perfectly aware of the difficulties that still separate us from an over-all agreement on the subject. Yet we contend, as we said at our meeting of 31 August (ENDC/PV.77/p.25), that this new stalemate is situated at a more advanced spot of our road. No doubt we have moved and we hope both sides will move still further towards an early agreement.

The Brazilian Government has expressed its support of Mr. Padilla Nervo's suggestion (ENDC/PV.34, p.16) of a deadline for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We have welcomed his suggestion as a very valuable one which may help us in our present endeavours, and we think that more active and thorough attention should be given to that particularly constructive idea.

For those reasons my delegation wishes to welcome and to express its support for the proposal advanced by the delegations of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to the effect that the Sub-Committee on Nuclear Weapon Tests should continue its endeavours during the forthcoming recess. We have always contended that basic priority should be given to the test ban issue and it is really unthinkable that we should discontinue our efforts on this matter at this point, when the chances of agreement appear somewhat improved. I still have the impression that the positions have come closer than each of the sides is prepared to admit and to acknowledge.

My Government has announced its intention to pursue efforts in the General Assembly in order to bring about a cessation of all nuclear tests and is willing to enter into diplomatic contact with all nations represented in the United Nations to foster this worthy cause. We think that the problem of a nuclear test ban already transcends the boundaries of a purely political or balance-of-power problem. It has really become a human problem and should be approached from the point of view of the interest of mankind, which is, in this case, the interest of survival. We cannot live indefinitely with this actual shooting going on, with one side testing and another side protesting, to use the expression of Mr. de Mello-Franco.

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

We do not believe that peace will be indefinitely secured through this ominous "balance of terror". Peace is not ultimately bred by terror or by deterrence, but by peaceful deeds and by a desire to seek solutions by agreement, mutual concessions and a spirit of compromise. And, as we said at one of our recent meetings, we do not believe that peace can be built on the moving sands of nuclear tests. Man has made such progress in technology and yet has been so slow in his progress in moral and political values that he is now in the dubious position and in the predicament of challenging the whole process of creation. Ours should be a creative effort, to avert the doom of destruction.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): There are still six speakers on the list. In view of the decision we took last Friday, 31 August, I propose, if there is no objection, to adjourn the meeting now and to resume our work this afternoon at half-past three.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

